TokenOps
Resources · Mainnet readiness

A CFO briefing in three numbers.

What's live on mainnet today, what's blocking the rest from mainnet, and what each operation costs once it ships.

Per-product status

Three products. Three different gates.

Live · Ethereum mainnet

fhe-disperse

Singleton + per-user OZ clones, operators call register(token) once, the singleton deploys a personal clone, then disperse({ mode: 'wallet' }) batches confidential payouts.

Risks today
  • ·Audit publication pending, the singleton is live, the report is not yet public.
  • ·Zama relayer dependency on every encrypt-side call.
Gas: ~450k EVM gas / ~1.2M HCU per 5-recipient batchTransfer ≈ $4–$7 per batch @ 20 gwei.
Sepolia only · audit in progress

fhe-vesting

Factory + LibClone deterministic clones with 87-byte packed immutable args. factory.createVesting(...) clones an audited implementation per recipient.

Risks today
  • ·Independent audit in progress, critical + high findings must resolve and re-test.
  • ·Mainnet KMS readiness, Zama's KMS must operate against mainnet with the same threshold posture.
  • ·Factory-clone determinism + packed immutable args carry higher audit surface than the singleton shape.
Gas: ~280k EVM gas / ~900k HCU per claim ≈ $2.50–$4 per claim @ 20 gwei.
Sepolia only · audit in progress

fhe-airdrop

Factory + EIP-712 gated claims, admin signs a per-recipient authorization off-chain; recipient submits the signature against the campaign clone to unlock.

Risks today
  • ·Independent audit in progress.
  • ·Mainnet KMS readiness, same gate as fhe-vesting.
  • ·EIP-712 domain separator + signature replay surface needs the same scrutiny as the LibClone factory.
Gas: ~310k EVM gas / ~1.1M HCU per claim ≈ $3–$5 per claim @ 20 gwei.
Why fhe-disperse went mainnet first
Lower audit surface, no LibClone determinism, no packed immutable args. Once the audit publishes for vesting + airdrop, they flip on the same Zama infrastructure that already powers fhe-disperse in mainnet production.
Risk model

Four moving parts a CFO needs to be able to name

1. Zama relayer dependency

Every encrypt and user-decrypt round-trip hits Zama's relayer. Outage degrades the interactive surface; pending on-chain ciphertexts already written remain decryptable when the relayer returns.

2. KMS / key-management story

The contract never reconstructs cleartext. KMS only signs decrypt-proofs for parties the contract granted ACL to via FHE.allow. No SDK-side key custody.

3. Mainnet gas + HCU envelope

FHEVM measures FHE-op cost in HCU; the per-tx ceiling is 5M HCU. The SDK targets ≤ 2 FHE ops per vesting-style calculation to stay well under the cap. ~2–3× plaintext equivalent at scale.

4. Per-claim ETH fee

All three FHE products charge a per-claim ETH gas fee at the factory level, designed to keep relayer-side compute economically rational at claim-volume scale.

Phase 2

The four gates

When all four close, mainnet addresses for fhe-vesting + fhe-airdrop land in DEPLOYED_ADDRESSES in a minor SDK release.

  1. 1

    Audit publication

    Independent audit closes, report linked from Resources › Audits, all critical and high findings resolved + re-tested.

  2. 2

    Mainnet KMS readiness

    Zama's KMS operates against Ethereum mainnet with the same threshold posture as the Sepolia deployment.

  3. 3

    Design-partner pilots

    At least three pilots running confidential vesting on Sepolia for a full quarter against production-like volume, surfacing telemetry into the SDK adapter.

  4. 4

    CREATE3 deployment

    Deploy from the audited deployer, same address on mainnet as on every other chain the same deployer publishes from.

See also

Resources · deployed addresses + audit posture · SDK telemetry · the relayer round-trip event your team alerts on · The encryptor source pattern · the three encryptor variants the relayer powers.